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INTRODUCTION
At a time when “email” was simply a misspelled word, Chief
Justice Warren’s opinion in Hanson v. Denckla warned that
advancements in communication and travel must not be read as
signaling “the eventual demise of all restrictions on . . . personal
jurisdiction.” 1 Throughout the history of the Court’s jurisprudence,
restrictions on personal jurisdiction have always centered upon
geographic boundaries. 2 As a result, the lower federal courts have
struggled to comply with Justice Warren’s mandate while grappling

∗ J.D. candidate, May 2011, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology. The author wishes to thank Adam Goldstein, Matthew Bolon, and
Mariana Karampelas, for their assistance and advice on this topic. This Comment is
dedicated to Alexis Geller for her encouragement and support.
1
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
2
Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal
Jurisdiction and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479 (1987).
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with claims arising from the virtual realm of the Internet. 3
Underscoring this challenge, one district court judge reasoned that
“[t]here being no District Court of Cyberspace, the defendants’
argument that laboring on the Internet defeats traditional personal
jurisdiction is unpersuasive; Defendants will have to settle
begrudgingly for the Western District of Virginia.” 4
The jurisdictional problems posed by claims arising from
cyberspace stem from the nature and origin of the Internet. 5
Concerned with both the rising costs of centralized computing and the
potential for Cold War hostilities, the progenitors of the Internet
sought to create a decentralized communications network that could
withstand a nuclear attack. 6 These efforts resulted in the initial
framework for the modern Internet—a diffuse “network of networks”
without a centralized hub. 7 As a result, the Internet defies traditional
notions of geographic boundaries, as online actions occur both
everywhere and nowhere at once. 8
Yet, out of all online activities, this Comment posits that
cybersquatting poses the greatest obstacle to the territorial restrictions
of personal jurisdiction. Cybersquatting occurs when an individual
seeks to profit by registering a website address—known as a domain
name—under another’s well-established trademark. 9 For example,
cybersquatting occurs when an individual with no affiliation to Coca3

Yasmin R. Tavakoli & David R Yohannan, Personal Jurisdiction in
Cyberspace: Where Does it Begin, and Where Does it End?, 23 No. 1 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2011).
4
Design88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik Productions, LLC, 133 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877
(W.D. Va. 2001).
5
John J. Schulze, Jr., Caveat E-Emptor: Solutions to the Jurisdictional
Problem of Internet Injury, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 615, 618 (2006).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997).
9
See Panavision, Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
Panavision is one of the first—and certainly most heralded—cybersquatting cases,
in which notorious cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen registered the domain name
“panavision.com,” and sought to extort a fee from the rightful trademark holder in
exchange for surrendering the domain name.
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Cola seeks to profit by registering the domain name “coca-cola.com.”
Because cybersquatting involves purely online activities, the lack of
any geographic nexus created between this conduct and the forum
state proves uniquely problematic for injured plaintiffs, as they bear
the burden of establishing a “prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction” over the defendant. 10 Yet, this burden may have been
lessened considerably due to a recent decision from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. 11 In a surprising ruling that is sure to
become the darling of all future plaintiffs in cybersquatting disputes,
the Seventh Circuit bent the traditional rules for personal jurisdiction
beyond their breaking point to uphold a cybersquatting claim filed
against GoDaddy—the world’s largest domain name provider. 12
In this Comment, I will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning
in uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy II) demonstrates the
fundamental disjunction between the International Shoe standard for
personal jurisdiction and claims of cybersquatting filed under the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”). Part I of this
Comment examines the growth and development of the Supreme
Court’s precedent regarding personal jurisdiction, highlighting the
territorial restrictions imposed by the due process clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. Part II of this Comment provides a
brief overview of cybersquatting and the ACPA. Part III of this
Comment focuses on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in GoDaddy II. In
Part IV, I shall demonstrate how both the GoDaddy II majority and
concurrence utilized reasoning that undermines existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and how Congress can resolve these
jurisdictional issues with the stroke of a pen.

10

E.g., uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy II), 623 F.3d 421, 423
(7th Cir. 2010).
11
Id.
12
See id. at 433.
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I. The Origins And Development Of Personal Jurisdiction
A. The Other Shoe Drops: The Shift to Minimum Contacts
The Supreme Court’s opinions on personal jurisdiction deal
primarily with the constitutional requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause, which provides that: “[n]o
State . . . shall deprive any person of life, liberty, and property, without
due process of law. . . .” 13 Throughout the history of the Court’s
jurisprudence, the Due Process Clause has consistently required some
physical connection between the defendant and the forum state. 14
Historically, this requirement imposed a severe limitation: A court’s
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant depended
entirely on her presence within the forum state. 15 This “power theory,”
articulated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, was
eventually cast aside in order to cope with the changing landscape of
American commerce. 16 As the reach of corporations began to extend
across state lines, the Court recognized that the “presence” of these
corporations could no longer be confined to their state of domicile. 17
Laying the framework for what would soon become the touchstone for
all Due Process inquiries into personal jurisdiction, the Court’s
landmark decision in International Shoe v. Washington crafted a new
standard for determining the constitutional scope of personal
jurisdiction.” 18
In International Shoe, the Court considered whether Due Process
permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
corporation based upon the commercial activities of its employees
13

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Perdue, supra note 2, at 509. The author explains that the Court’s opinions
evidence a belief that the requirements of personal jurisdiction serve a substantive
interest tied to state boundaries. Id. This substantive interest flows from the
requirement that the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state. Id.
15
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
16
See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (examining
the expanding role of corporations in interstate commerce).
17
Id.
18
Id.
14
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within the forum state. 19 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Stone
reasoned that a corporation’s “continuous and systematic” commercial
transactions within a state may well serve as a proxy for its presence
within the forum. 20 As the corporate entity itself is a constructive
fiction, its “presence” may manifest itself through the commercial
activities of its employees. 21 Thus, a corporation that enjoys the
benefit of conducting business within a state must also incur the costs
and obligations arising from those transactions. 22
The reasoning from International Shoe demonstrated both
equitable and practical considerations. 23 Namely, the Court recognized
that the rigid territorial restrictions on personal jurisdiction no longer
remained practical in light of the decreasing costs of interstate
commerce that allowed businesses to stretch their economic presence
across state lines. 24 As such, conditioning the exercise on the territorial
state boundaries was no longer sufficient to deal with vast expansion
of interstate commerce. 25 Instead, the Court declared that the exercise
of personal jurisdiction remains constitutionally permissible so long as
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.” 26
Although International Shoe heralded a new era in personal
jurisdiction, the Court’s newly minted jurisdictional framework test
remained loyal to the traditional emphasis on the geographical nexus
between the defendant and the forum. 27 This notion underscores the
19

Id. at 311.
Id. at 316–17.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 319.
23
See id. at 317. Previously, a nonresident corporation could only be subject to
jurisdiction if they provided an agent for the service of process. Id. The Court’s
decision recognized that a corporate “presence” could not be construed so narrowly.
Id. at 316–18.
24
Id. at 320.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
See id. (grounding the due process inquiry on the defendant’s activities
within the forum state).
20
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distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, which is outlined
in the following sections.
1. General Jurisdiction
The Court’s decision in Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia,
S.W. v. Hall 28 first articulated the distinction between general and
specific jurisdiction. 29 The concept of general jurisdiction is best
conceptualized as personal jurisdiction over the defendant, as she must
defend herself against any conceivable claim filed within the forum. 30
For instance, imagine that A lives in Colorado but is subject to general
jurisdiction in Iowa. While on vacation in Australia, A gets into a car
accident with Z, who hails from Spain. If Z decides to file a personal
injury lawsuit against A in Iowa, A must travel to the forum to defend
against the suit—despite the fact that none of the parties, evidence, or
injuries bear any relationship to A’s activities within the forum. 31
Indeed, one commentator argues that the concept of general
jurisdiction “should be termed ‘dispute-blind’ because the exercise of
jurisdiction does not depend on the nature of or the facts involved in
the dispute.”32 Instead, the exercise of general jurisdiction requires that
the defendant’s activities create a permanent proxy for her presence
within the forum state. 33
Although the general jurisdictional analysis only requires a single
inquiry—the relationship between the defendant’s activities and the
forum state—the Court’s opinion in Helicopteros demonstrates that
28

466 U.S. 408 (1984).
Id. at 414, n.8. While this was the first opinion in which the Court actually
referred to these concepts as such, these concepts were first expressed in
International Shoe. See 326 U.S. at 317–18.
30
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; accord, e.g.,GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421,
426 (7th Cir. 2010).
31
See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
32
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 807, 819 (2004) (citing Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 613, 680 (1988)).
33
See Rhodes, supra note 32, at 849–50 (noting that the contemporary doctrine
of general jurisdiction hinges upon a “constructive presence”).
29

379
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss2/3

6

Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 2

Spring 2011

this analysis imposes an incredibly high threshold requirement. 34 For
instance, the Helicopteros plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action in
Texas based upon a helicopter crash that occurred in Peru. 35 The
defendant corporation made numerous trips to forum, where it
contracted for helicopter services and spent over $4 million to
purchase 80% of its helicopter fleet and related equipment. 36
Additionally, the defendant sent its pilots, management, and
maintenance personnel to Texas for related training. 37 Nevertheless,
the Court found these frequent trips and high volume purchases failed
to create the forum contacts necessary to establish general
jurisdiction. 38 Rather, an earlier precedent demonstrates that this
requirement can only be met when a defendant directs her continuous
and systematic activities from a physical location within the forum
state. 39
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction is best conceptualized as jurisdiction over the
claim, rather than the defendant. 40 Essentially, specific jurisdiction
permits the court to adjudicate claims that “directly arise from or relate
to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 41 The relevant
analysis breaks down into two separate inquiries: (1) the defendant’s
contacts with the forum; and (2) the relationship between these
34

See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417–18 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v.
Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 518 (1923) (defendant that made frequent trips to
forum to purchase majority of its inventory was insufficient to establish general
jurisdiction).
35
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 410.
36
Id. at 410.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 415–16.
39
See id. at 414–415. Specifically, the Court examined the earlier decision of
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). In Perkins,
general jurisdiction existed when a Philippine mining company established a
temporary corporate office in Ohio due to the Japanese occupation of the Philippine
Islands. Id.
40
Cf. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985).
41
Id.
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contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. 42 These dual components serve a
primary policy consideration of the International Shoe framework. 43
Specifically the geographic nexus between the defendant’s contacts,
the forum, and the claim must allow the defendant to reasonably
anticipate that her conduct will subject her to the judicial powers of the
state. 44
The Court’s decisions mandate that the defendant’s intentional
conduct must create the geographic nexus between contacts, claim,
and forum. 45 In light of this requirement, the plaintiff’s contacts with
the forum cannot subject the defendant to the state’s judicial powers. 46
For instance, a Florida state court lacked jurisdiction over a trustee
whose only contact with the forum arose when the settlor of the trust
subsequently moved from Delaware to Florida. 47 Similarly,
Oklahoma’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a New Jersey car
dealership was held impermissible based solely upon the fact that the
plaintiff sustained an injury while driving through the forum. 48 These
cases demonstrate a recurring theme that appears throughout the
Court’s decisions: “The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum State.” 49 Rather, what is critical
to the exercise of personal jurisdiction is that the defendant
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws.” 50
By focusing on the geographic nexus established through the
substance of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the jurisdictional
42

See, e.g., GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 427–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyzing
components separately).
43
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474.
44
Id.; accord World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297
(1980).
45
See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 252.
48
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286.
49
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 252.
50
Id.
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analysis allows the defendant to reasonably anticipate the possibility
of having to defend her actions in the forum. 51 The Court’s opinions
take great pains to emphasize this requirement, often declaring that the
basis for exerting specific jurisdiction cannot stem from the
defendant’s “random, fortuitous, or attenuated” connections with the
forum that bear no relation to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim. 52
Thus, where the defendant lacks the necessary connections with the
forum to assert general jurisdiction, the strong geographic connection
among the defendant, the suit, and the forum required to exert specific
jurisdiction serves two primary functions. 53 First, it protects a nonresident defendant from the threat of litigation in a distant forum. 54
Second—and more importantly—it ensures that the jurisdictional
power of the respective states remain largely confined to acts
occurring within their territorial borders. 55
3. The Relatedness Inquiry
The aspect of the International Shoe analysis that has proven
particularly troubling for courts is determining the nexus between the
defendant’s forum contacts and the substance of the plaintiff’s claim—
often referred to as the “relatedness inquiry.” 56 Although Helicopteros
established that the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
claim must “arise from or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the
forum, 57 the Court’s decisions have never set forth a standard to
determine when this requirement is satisfied. 58 As a result, this
language from Helicopteros spawned a variety of disparate tests used
to determine whether a defendant’s contacts satisfy the “relatedness”
51

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 462 (1985).
53
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir. 2010).
57
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
58
Robert J. Condlin, "Defendant Veto" or "Totality of the Circumstances"? It's
Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard
Once Again, 54 CATH U. L. REV. 53, 126 (2004)
52
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component of the International Shoe standard. 59 The two most
commonly employed tests for this analysis derive from the tort-related
concepts of but-for and proximate causation. 60
Under the but-for causation standard, the exercise of specific
jurisdiction is often a foregone conclusion whenever the plaintiff can
establish that the defendant has purposefully availed itself within the
forum. 61 Devoid of any limiting factor, the but-for standard closely
scrutinizes each link in the causal chain to uncover any possible
connection between a defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. 62
Armed with the benefit of hindsight, courts applying the but-for
standard may exert specific jurisdiction so long as the plaintiff
demonstrates that her injury would not have occurred in the absence of
the defendant’s forum contacts. 63
At the other end of the spectrum, courts employing the proximate
cause standard impose a far greater threshold requirement for
demonstrating the relatedness component of the specific jurisdictional
inquiry. 64 The “proximate cause” standard requires a showing that the
defendant’s forum contacts are the legal cause for the plaintiff’s
injury. 65 Essentially, this analysis turns on whether any of the
defendant’s forum contacts are relevant to the facts underlying the
plaintiff’s complaint. 66
One last standard for examining the relationship between contacts
and the claim requires a closer examination, as this standard ultimately
controlled the outcome of the Seventh Circuit majority’s opinion in
GoDaddy II. 67 In O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., the Third Circuit

59

GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 429.
Id. at 430.
61
Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996).
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 430.
65
Id. (citing Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc., v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d
26, 35 (1st Cir. 1998)).
66
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 319 (3d Cir. 2007).
67
623 F.3d at 430.
60
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fashioned its “quid-pro-quo” standard in response to a rather esoteric
set of facts that gave rise to a negligence claim. 68
Following their vacation in Barbados, the plaintiff and his wife
began receiving newsletters and solicitations from the hotel they
stayed at during their trip. 69 The following year, the plaintiff and his
wife decided to return to Barbados, electing to stay at the same hotel
they had booked on their earlier trip.70 After securing their
reservations, the couple received a brochure from the hotel detailing
the various services provided at its spa. 71 Enticed by the brochure, the
couple called the hotel to purchase a spa package for the upcoming
trip. 72 After receiving one of the massages included in this package,
the plaintiff slipped in the shower and “tore his rotator cuff.” 73 Upon
returning home to Pennsylvania, the plaintiff filed a negligence claim
in federal court against the Barbadian resort. 74
Reasoning that the resort’s continued solicitation of the plaintiff
provided the forum contacts required by International Shoe, the Third
Circuit considered whether the negligence claim at bar arose from or
related to these contacts, finding that the resort’s continued solicitation
of the plaintiff provided the forum contacts required by International
Shoe. 75 Having rejected the proximate cause standard in an earlier
precedent, 76 the Third Circuit’s opinion in O’Connor cast aside the
but-for cause standard as too over-inclusive. 77 In an attempt to strike a
balance between these two extremes, the court carved out a new “quidpro-quo” standard for assessing the relationship between contacts and
claim. 78

68

496 F.3d at 315–16.
Id. at 315.
70
Id. at 316.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 318.
76
Id. at 320.
77
Id. at 322.
78
Id. at 323.
69
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The Third Circuit explained that the relatedness inquiry should
focus on the “reciprocity principle” underlying the requirements of
specific jurisdiction. 79 Specifically, each economic or legal benefit
derived from a defendant’s forum contacts naturally gives rise to
accompanying obligations. 80 In light of this concept, the relatedness
component of the International Shoe test must “maintain balance in
this reciprocal exchange.” 81 Although conceding that this method is
less stringent than the proximate cause standard employed by other
courts, the Third Circuit reasoned that the relationship between the
claim and contacts must be “intimate enough to keep the quid-pro-quo
proportional and personal jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.” 82
Turning to the substance of the plaintiff’s claim, the Third Circuit
concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff’s negligence
claim and the resort’s forum contacts was “intimate enough” to uphold
specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. 83 Essentially, the court
reasoned that “through its mailings and phone calls,” the resort had
entered into a contractual obligation to provide the plaintiff’s with spa
services. 84 The benefits that the hotel received from this contract gave
rise to certain obligations—such as ensuring that it exercised due care
in performing its services. 85 Having failed to do so, the court
concluded that the relationship between the plaintiff’s claim and the
hotel’s various brochures and phone calls were intimately related
enough to keep the quid-pro-quo balanced and reasonable. 86
Ironically, although the Third Circuit seemed quite enamored with
its “new” standard for examining the relatedness component of the
specific jurisdictional inquiry, this quid-pro-quo standard is little more
than a repackaged version of the but-for causation standard that the
court expressly rejected as too “over- inclusive.” 87 Indeed, the court’s
79

Id.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See id. at 322.
80
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explanation of the proportional relationship between economic
benefits and obligations is primarily a rephrasing of the policy
rationales underlying the International Shoe decision 88 —not a formula
for determining the relationship between contacts and claim. If
anything, the ambiguous language of the O’Connor decision
seemingly incorporates an ad-hoc cost-benefit analysis into the but-for
standard for determining the relationship between contacts and
claim. 89 Under the Third Circuit’s rationale, would this relationship
between the plaintiff’s injury and the hotel’s contacts have ceased to
exist if the hotel simply offered to provide the massage for only a
dollar? What if the parties had waited to consummate the transaction
until the plaintiff arrived in Barbados? These types of economic
factors speak to whether the “nature and quality” of the defendant’s
contacts form the requisite geographic nexus with the forum, not the
relationship between these contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. 90
Although the Supreme Court has yet to endorse any of these
standards, the proximate cause standard tracks closest with the guiding
principles of the International Shoe framework—the defendant must
be able to reasonably anticipate that her conduct will subject her to the
state’s judicial powers. 91 Whereas the but-for standard threatens to
trap an unwary defendant within the links of an attenuated causal
chain, the proximate cause standard allows defendant to reasonably
anticipate being subject to jurisdiction within the forum by requiring
that her conduct forms the legal cause for the plaintiff’s claim. 92
Moreover, this requirement of legal causation avoids the quid-pro-quo
standard’s discretionary cost-benefit analysis detailed above. 93
88

See 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining that one who enjoys the benefits
and protections of a forum’s laws must bear the accompanying obligations).
89
The Third Circuit explained that the relatedness component must ensure a
close fit between the scope of the benefits derived from the defendant’s forum
contacts and the accompanying obligations. See 496 F.3d at 423.
90
See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
91
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985); Nowak v. Tak How
Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996).
92
Nowak, 94 F.3d at 715.
93
See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 323 (3d Cir. 2007)
(balancing economic benefits against resulting legal obligations).
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4. The Reasonableness Inquiry
Once the plaintiff provides a prima facie case for personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, a court must examine additional
factors to determine the reasonableness of maintaining a suit within
the forum. 94 Such factors include “the burden on the defendant, the
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies, and the shared interest of the several State’s in
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.” 95
The Court’s opinions steadfastly claim that this reasonableness
inquiry forms a critical component of any jurisdictional inquiry;
however, its treatment of the aforementioned factors remains little
more than a token gesture. 96 As the Court noted in Burger King, a
defendant that “seeks to defeat jurisdiction . . . must present a
compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would
render jurisdiction unreasonable.” 97 As one commentator notes, the
Court’s opinions demonstrate that the final outcome rests almost
exclusively on whether the defendant has created the requisite
minimum contacts by “purposefully availing” herself of the benefits
and protections of the forum state’s laws. 98
B. Tabloids and Dirty Magazines: The Bases of Jurisdiction in
GoDaddy II
Before proceeding further, there are two particular Supreme Court
precedents that require a closer examination in order to understand the

94

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476.
Id. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
William M. Richman, Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 599, 634 (1993).
97
Id. (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477).
98
Id.
95
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Seventh Circuit’s fractured decision in GoDaddy II: Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine 99 and Calder v. Jones. 100
1. The Keeton decision
The broadest proposition that emerges from Keeton is relatively
straightforward: A plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that a
defendant corporation specifically focused its business activities on the
forum to demonstrate the purposeful availment requirement of
International Shoe. 101 Rather, a corporation purposefully avails itself
in every forum where it conducts a substantial amount of business.102
In Keeton, the plaintiff brought suit against Hustler Magazine in a
New Hampshire State Court, alleging that the magazine printed
libelous stories about her in five separate issues of its publication. 103
Although the magazine company was incorporated in Ohio and held
its principal place of business in California, it circulated approximately
ten to fifteen thousand copies of its magazine throughout New
Hampshire each month. 104 As the Court explained in its analysis, the
Keeton defendant purposefully directed its business activities at the
forum through these regular monthly sales of its publication. 105
Therefore, the Court declared that it was “unquestionable” that New
Hampshire could exercise specific jurisdiction over any claims directly
arising from this monthly circulation of the defendant’s magazine. 106
The tort of libel occurs wherever a publication is circulated, thus New
Hampshire could clearly exercise jurisdiction over any claims arising
from the circulation of the defendant’s magazine within the forum. 107
While this notion may seem fairly straightforward, a rather unique
99

465 U.S. 770 (1984).
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
101
See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779 (forum contacts were a limited part of
defendant’s general business).
102
Id. at 779–80.
103
Id. at 772.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 774.
106
Id.
107
Id.
100
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aspect of the law of libel added a complicated twist to the Keeton
decision—the single publication rule. 108
The single publication rule is a limited exception to the general
rules governing defamation. 109 Generally, each identical, defamatory
statement made by the same individual constitutes a separate cause of
action. 110 The single publication rule, however, allows plaintiffs to
bring a single, multi-state libel claim for every allegedly libelous
publication circulated through the entire country. 111 Put another way,
the Keeton plaintiff brought suit in New Hampshire for every copy of
the magazine distributed throughout the United States—despite the
fact that only a small portion of these magazines were actually
circulated within the forum. 112 As such, both the district and appellate
courts below dismissed the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction,
reasoning, “the New Hampshire tail is too small to wag so large an
out-of-state dog.” 113
Disagreeing with the reasoning of the courts below, the
Supreme Court found that New Hampshire could properly exercise
specific jurisdiction over plaintiff’s multi-state libel claim. 114 First, the
Court explained that the defendant had “continuously and deliberately
exploited the New Hampshire market” through its monthly circulation
within the forum, and thus could “reasonably anticipate” being haled
into the forum state to defend against libel claims directly arising from
the contents of its magazine. 115 Moreover, the defendant should
anticipate that such suits would seek to recover damages for every
publication circulated throughout the country, as the defendant “could
be charged with knowledge of the single publication rule.” 116 Under
this reasoning, the Court concluded that Due Process did not shield the
108

See id. at 773.
Id. at 774 n.3 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577(A)(4) (1977)).
110
Id.
111
Id. at 773.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 781.
115
Id.
116
Id.
109
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defendant from being called upon to defend against a multi-state libel
suit wherever it regularly sold and distributed its magazine. 117
2. The Effects Test: Creating a Geographic Nexus with the Forum
Through the Commission of an Intentional Tort
Decided the same day as Keeton, the Calder opinion added an
unexpected wrinkle into the minimum contacts test—providing a
limited means for exerting personal jurisdiction based on acts
committed outside the forum state. 118 In Calder, the plaintiff filed suit
for libel in California based on an article written and edited by the
defendants. 119 The defendants, however, arguably lacked any
meaningful contacts with the forum that related to the plaintiff’s
claim. 120 Both defendants lived and worked in Florida, where the
allegedly libelous article was written and edited. 121 Although the
magazine had its highest circulation within the state of California,
neither defendant had any control over the magazine’s distribution, nor
did they derive any direct economic benefit from its circulation within
the forum. 122
Notwithstanding the lack of any economic ties to the forum, the
Court reasoned that the defendants had created the requisite minimum
contacts to support specific jurisdiction through their article’s effects
within the forum. 123 Emphasizing that the claim at issue did not arise
from “untargeted negligence,” the Calder opinion noted that the
defendants had “expressly aimed” their conduct at the forum state
through their allegedly libelous article. 124 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court carefully noted that the defendants culled the information
117

Id.
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (explaining how the
defendant’s allegedly tortious article—written entirely in Florida—created the
contacts necessary to uphold personal jurisdiction in California).
119
Id. at 784.
120
Id. at 785–86.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 789–90.
118
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used in their article exclusively from sources in California. 125 The
article focused entirely on the plaintiff’s activities in California, where
the plaintiff lived and worked in the entertainment industry. 126 As
such, the resulting harm created by the article would have its greatest
effect in California, where the damage to the plaintiff’s reputation
would negatively impact her acting career. 127 In light of these factors,
the Court concluded that the defendants should have reasonably
anticipated that they might be “hailed into court” based upon the
harmful effects of their article.128
The reasoning of Calder provided what is now commonly known
as the three-pronged “effects test” for asserting jurisdiction based upon
an intentional act committed outside of the forum state. The effects
test requires that the defendant: (1) commit an intentional act; (2)
recognize his conduct’s harmful effect on the plaintiff; and (3)
expressly aim his conduct toward the forum. 129
Notably, Calder does not provide an alternative to the
International Shoe standard. 130 This is why the Ninth Circuit once
reasoned that characterizing Calder’s analytical framework as the
“effects test” may place too much emphasis on the harmful effects
prong. 131 In particular, Calder “cannot stand for the broad proposition
that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum state will
always give rise to specific jurisdiction.” 132 Had the Court intended
such an expansive grant of personal jurisdiction, it would have clearly

125

Id. at 789.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 790.
129
Id.
130
See id. (explaining that exercise of personal jurisdiction necessarily requires
an examination of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state).
131
Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006)
(something more is required than mere foreseeability of harmful effect felt within the
forum).
132
Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087(9th Cir. 2000)).
126
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stated as much in its opinion. 133 Rather, Calder’s intensive fact-based
analysis demonstrates that the express aiming component of the effects
test actually provides the forum contacts necessary to exert personal
jurisdiction. 134
C. The Lighter Side of Jurisdiction: The Zippo Test
As noted earlier, the International Shoe standard serves a critical
role in ensuring that a state’s jurisdictional powers remain confined
within its territorial boundaries. 135 Naturally, these territorial
restrictions have proven particularly problematic in regards to Internetrelated claims because the allegedly harmful conduct occurs in a realm
that defies all notions of geographic borders. 136 Although the Supreme
Court has yet to fashion a jurisdictional standard for Internet-related
claims, the Western District of Pennsylvania attempted to fashion such
a test in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 137
This “Zippo test” provides three categories situated along a
sliding-scale that determines the propriety of exercising personal
jurisdiction based upon the interactivity of a defendant’s website. 138 At
the “far end of this spectrum” are highly interactive websites that
enable a defendant to conduct business over the Internet. 139 If such
websites allow the defendant to enter into contractual relationships
with its customers, the exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. 140 At
133

Contra Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (reaffirming the notion
that the exercise of jurisdiction requires a court to examine each individual
defendant’s contacts with the forum state).
134
See, e.g., Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2010)
(exercising personal jurisdiction requires forum state injury and “something more” in
the form of conduct expressly aimed at the forum state); accord Condlin, supra note
58, at 94. Here, the author explains that the Calder Court emphasized the express
“targeting” of the forum to demonstrate why it was “fair to take jurisdiction over the
defendants.” Condlin, supra note 58, at 94.
135
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
136
Tavakoli & Yohannan, supra note 3, at 3.
137
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997)
138
Id. at 1124.
139
Id.
140
Id.
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the other end of Zippo’s sliding-scale are strictly passive websites that
“only make information available” to interested parties. 141 Under the
Zippo standard, these passive websites are insufficient to support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 142 Between these two poles lies a
middle category, comprised of those websites that allow users to
“exchange information” with the defendant’s “host computer.” 143
Essentially, Zippo’s sliding-scale approach applies solely to this
middle category, as the Zippo standard automatically confers or denies
personal jurisdiction whenever a website is deemed either highlyinteractive or strictly passive. 144 When websites fall into Zippo’s
middle category, however, the issue of personal jurisdiction is resolved
by closely scrutinizing “the level of interactivity and commercial
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.” 145
While many courts initially seized upon Zippo as a useful guide
for exerting personal jurisdiction over Internet-based claims, many
commentators question the continued utility of this approach. 146 This
is because courts are perfectly capable of determining whether a
defendant created the forum contacts necessary to uphold jurisdiction
without regard to the interactivity of her website. 147 Although modern
companies may use more sophisticated electronic mediums for
conducting business, the geographic connection created through their

141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
See id.
145
Id.
146
See, e.g., Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the
Internet Has Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction
Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559 (2009); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always
Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal
Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 (2005); Bunmi Awoyemi, Zippo Is Dying,
Should It Be Dead?: The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction by U.S. Federal Courts
over Non-Domiciliary Defendants in Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Arising Out
of Cyberspace, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 37 (2005).
147
See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 146, at 579–80. The author explains that the
Court’s development of the International Shoe framework sufficiently deals with
remote interactions between the defendant and forum.
142
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forum contacts remains the same. 148 For instance, if a company
regularly sells and ships its products to customers in a particular
forum, it makes little difference whether the company locates its
customers through telephone solicitation, targeted catalogue mailings,
or an interactive website. 149 As one commentator explains, the Zippo
test adds nothing substantive to the International Shoe standard for
personal jurisdiction. 150
D. Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts
The requirements for personal jurisdiction in the federal courts
differ fundamentally from personal jurisdiction in state courts. 151 The
various personal jurisdiction requirements detailed above all pertain to
the International Shoe framework, which embodies the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 152 Notably, the federal judiciary
is not always bound by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which acts as a limiting factor on state judiciaries. 153
When a federal court adjudicates state law claims between parties of
different states, it exercises the judicial powers of the state in which it
sits. 154 Conversely, when a federal court considers claims arising
under federal law it wields the judicial powers of the United States as
a whole, rather than the powers of a particular state. 155 In this context,
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no limitations on the powers of
148

Id. at 580.
Id. at 580.
150
Id. at 581.
151
Howard M. Erichson, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal
Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1117 (1989)
152
See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 311(1945)
(examining personal jurisdiction requirements of Fourteenth Amendment).
153
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1068.1 (3d ed. 2010) (federal court is only bound by
International Shoe when considering state law claims in diversity jurisdiction).
154
Erichson, supra note 151, at 1140.
155
Id. The federal courts possess limited subject matter jurisdiction, which
means that they can only hear certain types of disputes. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 153. There are two forms of subject matter jurisdiction, being: (1)
diversity jurisdiction; and (2) subject matter jurisdiction. See id.
149
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the federal government. 156 Instead, the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment limits the federal court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction. 157
The language of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause
mirrors that of the Fourteenth Amendment’s, 158 however, the Fifth
Amendment imposes a far lower threshold requirement for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. 159 While the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment condition the exercise of
personal jurisdiction on the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the
critical distinction is the nature of the applicable forum. 160
Specifically, when a federal court examines an issue of federal law, the
applicable forum is the United States as a whole. 161 As a result, the
Fifth Amendment’s threshold requirement for personal jurisdiction is
whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the United States as
a whole. 162 Although many federal courts require that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction must also comport with the fairness component
of the International Shoe rubric, the majority of these circuits concede
that these concerns are sufficiently protected through the venue and
transfer provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 163 The
national contacts approach, however, is only one limitation on a
federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction in cases arising

156

WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153. By its terms, the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to the states. Id.
157
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153.
158
The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment both
provide that “no person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. Const Amend. V.; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
159
Note, Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal
Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARV. L. REV. 470, 484–85 (1981); cf. United States v.
De Ortiz, 910 F.2d 376, 381 (7th Cir. 1990).
160
See Erichson, supra note 151, at 1141.
161
Id.
162
Id. While the Supreme Court has declined to expressly adopt this approach,
the federal courts generally apply this standard in claims arising under federal law.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153.
163
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 153, at n.34 (collecting cases).
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under federal law; the defendant must also be amenable to service of
process. 164
Given the low threshold requirement of the national contacts test,
the federal court’s ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant essentially hinges on the service of process. 165 When the
federal law at issue provides for nationwide service of process, the
service of a summons confers personal jurisdiction over any defendant
in the United States so long as she has sufficient national contacts. 166
However, when the federal law lacks a provision that allows for
nationwide service of process, a federal court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction becomes analogous to that of the local state judiciary—
both must comply with the requirements of International Shoe. 167
II. TYPOSQUATTING, CYBERSQUATTING, AND THE ACPA
A. But Are You Still Master of Your Domain? The Rise of
Cybersquatting
Dennis Toeppen may never fully appreciate how his business
ventures at the end of the twentieth century thrust the issue of
cybersquatting into the national spotlight. 168 During the mid-nineties,
Toeppen registered hundreds of names incorporating widely
recognized trademarks, such as EddieBauer.com, YankeeStadium.com,
and NorthwestAirlines.com. 169 His claim to fame, however, derived
from his registration of the domain name Panavision.com, which he
used to create a rudimentary website that depicted aerial photographs

164

See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154.
See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987)
(“Service of process is how a court gets jurisdiction over the person.”)
166
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154; See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (stating
that service of a summons confers personal jurisdiction over the defendant if
authorized by federal law).
167
See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C).
168
Ray Everett-Church, Domain Names, in THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA,
VOLUME 1, 455 (Hossein Bigdoli ed., 2003).
169
Id.
165
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of Panna, Illinois. 170 When Panavision International, holder of the
registered trademark “Panavision,” learned of these events, it
demanded that Toeppen refrain from using both its trademark and the
Panavison.com domain name. 171 In response, Toeppen sent a letter to
Panavision offering to “settle the matter” for the price of $13,000, and
inquired why Panavision would “want to fund [its] attorney’s purchase
of a new boat” when it could obtain the domain name “cheaply and
simply instead?” 172 Rather than succumbing to these demands,
Panavision filed suit against Toeppen for the dilution of its
trademark. 173 Toeppen instantly became what one commentator refers
to as “the poster child for the crusade against cybersquatting.” 174
Early cybersquatters, such as Toeppen, utilized cybersquatting as
a technology-driven form of extortion. 175 Before it became
commonplace for large corporations to develop their own websites,
early cybersquatters would preemptively register a domain name under
a well-known corporate trademark, hoping to sell the infringing
domain name to the rightful trademark holder for a negotiated price. 176
Yet, even those technologically savvy trademark holders that managed
to outrun potential cybersquatters in the race to the registrar quickly
learned of another danger lurking along the information
superhighway—Typosquatters. 177
As the growth of new industries often leads to specialization, a
stylized breed of cybersquatters referred to as “typosquatters” began
blazing their own path into the burgeoning online world.
Understanding that the domain name game provided countless roads to
170

Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in
Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309, 322 (2002) (chronicling the background and
controversy surrounding Panavision, Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir.
1998)).
171
Panavision, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998).
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Sherry, supra note 170, at 322.
175
Mark A. Rush, Jeffrey M. Gitchel, and Wade J. Savoy, Protecting the Open
Seas: Fighting Cyberpiracy, 5 No. 1 CYBERSPACE LAW. 1, 18 (2000).
176
Id.
177
Id.
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riches, typosquatters set about incorporating misspelled—but
strikingly similar—trademarks into domain names as an alternative to
cybersquatting. 178 By registering domain names under various
iterations of a well-known trademark—such as YooTube.com or
UTube.com—the typosquatter seeks to reap the profits from the
careless spelling of unwary Internet users. 179 The hasty web-surfer that
enters “wwwebay.com” (notice the missing period after “www”) into
her Internet browser may unintentionally fill the coffers of a clever
typosquatter through a variety of means. 180 She may find a website
offering similar products or advertising for a business rival of the
rightful trademark holder. 181 Alternatively, she may find herself
“mousetrapped” upon her arrival at the misspelled page, unable to exit
due to infinite pop-up ads that provide a stream of revenue with each
click of the mouse. 182
The innovative typosquatter can also exponentially increase her
ill-gotten proceeds by registering countless variations of infringing
websites. 183 After all, statistical studies demonstrate that between ten
and twenty percent of all manually entered domain names contain
typographical errors, creating upwards of 20 million “wrong numbers”
each day. 184 These staggering statistics demonstrate how typosquatting
legend John Zuccarini profited to the tune of $1 million dollars—each
year—through his 3000 infringing domain names. 185 To be fair, Mr.
Zuccarini’s motivations weren’t solely profit-driven. 186 Zuccarini
gained his notoriety by mixing business with pleasure, registering
numerous domain names that resembled children’s websites, such as

178

Id.
Paul Boutin, The Typo Millionaires, SLATE, Feb. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2113397.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
179
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“Dinseyland.com.” 187 However, these innocuous looking domain
names actually guided youthful web-surfers to an entirely different
form of entertainment—hardcore pornography. 188
Although trademark holders prevailed in a few notable battles in
the early days of online trademark disputes, the cybersquatters soon
gained the upper-hand in this ongoing war by navigating through the
loopholes in existing trademark dilution laws. 189 Specifically, these
laws required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the putative defendant
engaged in the commercial use of the infringing domain name. 190
Many cybersquatters, however, merely “warehoused” infringing
domain names and waited for the rightful trademark-holder to contact
them with a lucrative purchase offer. 191 This created substantial
difficulties for trademark holders that preferred to put their resources
toward legal remedies, as this “passive” cybersquatting failed to
satisfy the required element of commercial use.192 As cybersquatters
grew adept at avoiding legal sanctions, the need for new legislation
became increasingly clear. 193
B. There’s a new sheriff in town:
The Congressional enactment of the ACPA
In 1999, Congress responded to the growing problem of
cybersquatting by passing the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (“ACPA”). 194 The ACPA provides civil liability for one who
187

Roy Mark, Notorious URL Scammer Pleads Guilty, ESECURITY PLANET,
Dec. 11, 2003,
http://www.esecurityplanet.com/trends/article.php/3287981/Notorious-URLScammer-Pleads-Guilty.htm.
188
Id.
189
Jonathon H. Anschell & John Lucas, What’s in a Name: Dealing with
Cybersquatters, 21 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 3, 3 (2003).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id.
194
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2011). The ACPA was incorporated into the Federal
Trademark Code commonly referred to as the Lantham Act. Joseph J. Weissman,
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“registers, traffics in, or uses” an infringing domain name, “without
regards to the goods or services” offered by either litigant. 195 Rather
than requiring commercial use of the domain name, the ACPA only
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the cybersquatter’s “bad-faith
intent to profit” from the appropriated trademark. 196 To further
alleviate the burden on plaintiffs, the ACPA provides a non-exhaustive
list of means of demonstrating the necessary bad-faith intent to profit,
such as:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the
person, if any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal
name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly
used to identify that person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in
connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the
mark in a site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark
owner's online location to a site accessible under the domain
name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark,
either for commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the
site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the
domain name to the mark owner or any third party for
financial gain without having used, or having an intent to use,
the domain name in the bona fide offering of any goods or
services, or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of
such conduct;

The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act: Developments Through Its First
Six Years, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1058, 1058 (2005).
195
See 15 U.S.C.. § 1125(d)(1)(a).
196
See id.
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(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false
contact information when applying for the registration of the
domain name, the person's intentional failure to maintain
accurate contact information, or the person's prior conduct
indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical or
confusingly similar to marks of others that are distinctive at
the time of registration of such domain names, or dilutive of
famous marks of others that are famous at the time of
registration of such domain names, without regard to the
goods or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's
domain name registration is or is not distinctive and
famous. 197
Notably, Congress expressly provided a safe harbor provision for
domain name registrars to shelter them from liability for their
customers’ acts of cybersquatting. 198 This provision expressly exempts
a registrar from liability for merely registering an infringing domain
name “absent a showing of bad faith intent to profit from such
registration or maintenance of the domain name.” 199
Although the ACPA clearly provides a targeted remedy to address
the harm caused by cybersquatting, trademark holders often faced an
uphill battle in bringing a cause of action for this form of online
trademark infringement. 200 While both cybersquatting and
typosquatting may form the basis of a claim under the ACPA, 201 the
fact remains that the wrongful conduct takes place entirely online.
197

Id. at §§ 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)–(IX).
Id. at § 1114 (2)(D)(iii).
199
Id.
200
See, e.g., Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 221,
223–24 (D.R.I. 2005) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction upon finding that
act of cybersquatting was not aimed at forum state).
201
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) (proscribing the registration of an
domain name that is identical or strikingly similar to another’s previously registered
trademark).
198
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Whereas cybersquatting pioneers such as Dennis Toeppen resorted to
outright extortion in order to profit from their trade, 202 this species of
early cybersquatting has almost entirely vanished into antiquity. 203
Modern cybersquatters have no need to ransom out their infringing
domain names to the rightful trademark holders. 204 Instead, the safer
road to riches is lined with pay-per-click advertising and the poor
typing skills of the masses. 205 And though the ACPA is strictly a
creature of federal law, the statute itself does not contain any provision
for nationwide service of process.206 Thus, in claims filed under the
ACPA, a federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport
with the geographic nexus requirements of International Shoe. 207
However, the Seventh Circuit’s fractured analysis in GoDaddy II
indicates that cybersquatting has outgrown the limitations of
International Shoe.
III. UBID, INC, V. GODADDY GROUP, INC.
From its headquarters in Arizona, GoDaddy provides domain
name registration and website hosting for customers located across the
country. 208 Arguably, the company’s rapid growth is largely
attributable to its aggressive advertising campaign. 209 Its frequentlyrun television commercials featuring the “GoDaddy Girls” have
become somewhat of a staple during the past several Super Bowls. 210
202

See supra Part II.A. As discussed earlier in this Comment, Toeppen is best
known for registering a domain name under Panavision’s well-known trademark. He
attempted to profit from his actions by offering to release the domain name in
exchange for a bribe.
203
Patrick Thibodeau, Cybersquatting Can Yield Pay-Per-Click Bounties,
COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 16, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/289576.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010).
207
Id.
208
uBID Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc. (GoDaddy I), 673 F. Supp. 2d 621, 625
(N.D. Ill. 2009), rev’d 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010).
209
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424.
210
Id.
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For those that prefer stadium seating to the comforts of home,
GoDaddy’s billboards and advertisements appear at sporting arenas
throughout the country. 211 Additionally, fans of Indycar racing may
recognize GoDaddy’s logo from driver Danica Patrick’s car, while golf
aficionados can glimpse it emblazoned on Anna Rawlson’s hat. 212 As a
result of its efforts, GoDaddy has emerged as one of the largest
domain name registrars in the country. 213
Despite its national client-base, GoDaddy’s operations are limited
almost entirely to its home state of Arizona. 214 Indeed, the company
has few offices or employees outside of its home state. 215 GoDaddy
provides the majority of its services on an automated basis; customers
throughout the world can access GoDaddy’s services remotely through
its website. 216 Moreover, the company handles its domain name
registration and maintenance through its computer servers in
Scottsdale, Arizona. 217
GoDaddy’s business model provides customers with two different
methods of registering domain names. 218 First, GoDaddy’s aptly
named “free parking” service allows its customers to register domain
names at no-charge. GoDaddy creates a rudimentary website under its
customers’ domain names and monetizes the sites through “pay-perclick” advertising. 219 As an alternative to its free parking services,
GoDaddy sells a “cash parking” service, which allows its customer to
share in the pay-per-click advertising revenue in exchange for a small
monthly fee.
211

See id. at 428. Notably, the opinion only refers to GoDaddy’s billboards in
Illinois stadiums. Id. Nevertheless, the fact that GoDaddy referred to Illinois as only
a part of its national advertising campaign indicates that these billboards and signs
appear at sports stadiums throughout the country. Id.
212
Id. at 424.
213
GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 625.
214
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424.
215
Id.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
See Complaint at ¶ 8, GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621 (N.D.Ill. 2009) (No.
09 cv 02123), 2009 WL 1109520.
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Like GoDaddy, uBID’s revenue stream flows from the
electronic currents of cyberspace. 220 Headquartered in Chicago, uBID
runs an online auction service that deals primarily with excess
inventory of electronics manufacturers through its website,
uBID.com. 221 In 2009, uBID discovered that numerous individuals
had registered 171 domain names that bore a substantial similarity to
uBID.com through GoDaddy’s cash parking and free parking
services. 222 Yet rather than pursuing the various individuals, uBID
named a single defendant in its complaint—GoDaddy, the Internetbased registrar that provided the infringing domain names. 223
Perhaps anticipating the difficulties created by the ACPA’s
safe harbor provision for registrars, uBID’s allegations focused
entirely on the manner in which GoDaddy manifested a bad-faith
intent to profit from the parked pages created under the infringing
domain names. 224 First, GoDaddy trafficked in these infringing
domain names despite its knowledge that they were “identical or
confusingly similar” to uBID’s well-known trademarks. 225 Second,
GoDaddy offered to sell these infringing domain-names for “financial
gain.” 226 Third, GoDaddy used pay-per-click advertising links that
diverted customers to the websites of uBID’s competitors. 227
In response to uBID’s complaint, GoDaddy filed a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to
transfer the case to its home state of Arizona. 228

220

GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 423.
Id.
222
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of their Motion to Dismiss,
or, in the Alternative, to Transfer Venue, at 5, GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621
(N.D.Ill. 2009) rev’d 623 F.3d (No. 109CV02123), 2009 WL 2236587 [hereinafter
GoDadddy’s Motion to Dismiss].
223
Id.
224
See Complaint, supra note 219, at ¶ 41–43 (detailing GoDaddy’s alleged
acts of cybersquatting).
225
Id. at ¶ 43.
226
Id. at ¶ 42.
227
Id. at ¶ 41.
228
GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (N.D.Ill. 2009).
221
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A. The District Court’s Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Penning the opinion for the district court, Judge Charles Kocoras
began by dismissing the notion that GoDaddy’s advertising and sales
within the state of Illinois established the “continuous and systematic”
contacts necessary to support general jurisdiction. 229 Next, Judge
Kocoras focused on whether uBID met its burden in establishing a
prima facie case for specific jurisdiction over its claim. 230 Notably,
Judge Korcoras excluded GoDaddy’s advertisements and the majority
of its sales within the forum from the specific jurisdiction analysis.231
Although uBID contended that both of these factors should weigh
heavily in its favor, Judge Korcoras explained that the only relevant
facts in the inquiry were those that directly pertained to the litigation
between the parties or the “operative facts of the dispute.” 232 As a
result, the opinion’s specific jurisdiction analysis was confined to
whether the two infringing domain names registered by Illinois
residents established the minimum contacts needed to support specific
jurisdiction. 233
To uBID’s dismay, Judge Korcoras answered this question in the
negative. 234 Presuming that GoDaddy had only established two Illinois
contacts that pertained to the litigation at hand, Judge Kocoras
determined that GoDaddy’s business model precluded any
determination that the domain name registrar had purposefully availed
itself such that it should “reasonably expect to be subject to
jurisdiction in Illinois.” 235 Specifically, GoDaddy had purposefully
established a website that allowed its customers to register domain
names on an automated basis. 236 From anywhere in the world, a
229

Id. at 627–28.
See id. at 628.
231
See id. at 628–29.
232
Id. at 628 (citing GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018,
1024 (7th Cir. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233
GoDaddy I, 673 F. Supp. at 628.
234
Id. at 628–29.
235
Id. at 629.
236
Id.
230
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customer could register, purchase, and obtain a desired domain name
without ever interacting with a GoDaddy employee. 237
Viewed from this standpoint, Judge Kocoras determined that
GoDaddy’s customers, rather than GoDaddy itself, initiated the only
contacts relevant to the litigation—the infringing websites registered
by two Illinois residents. 238 Reasoning that these registrations were
“the unilateral activity of . . . third [parties],” Judge Korcoras
explained that GoDaddy could not reasonably anticipate being haled
into court based solely upon these contacts. 239 Accordingly, the
District Court dismissed uBID’s complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction. 240
B. The Seventh Circuit Majority’s Opinion
Unwilling to accept defeat quite so easily, uBID subsequently
appealed the district court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, 241 and the majority’s opinion demonstrated that uBID
would be rewarded for its perseverance. 242 While agreeing with the
lower court’s determination that GoDaddy’s sales and marketing
efforts in Illinois failed to support general jurisdiction, the majority
left no doubt that its specific jurisdiction analysis would follow a
different line of reasoning than that of the court below. 243
Drawing support from the Supreme Court’s decision in Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, the court reasoned that the domain name registrar
had purposefully availed itself within the forum as a result of its
national business presence. 244 GoDaddy, just like the defendant in
Keeton, intentionally solicited business from every state through its
237

Id.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 630.
241
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 433 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing the decision
below).
242
See id. at 423.
243
Id. at 423, 426.
244
Id.
238
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national advertising campaign—including the forum at issue. 245 As a
reward for its efforts, GoDaddy successfully drew business from
thousands of Illinois residents. 246 And while these customers
contributed a relatively small portion of GoDaddy’s overall revenue,
the company nevertheless received millions from its business within
the forum. 247
In light of this substantial revenue stream flowing from Illinois to
GoDaddy’s corporate headquarters in Arizona, the majority opinion
quickly pierced through the company’s attempt to shield itself behind
its automated processing system. 248 While the majority of its
customers secure the company’s services without any human
interaction, GoDaddy intentionally structured its business in this
fashion. 249 Citing to its own previous decisions, the majority reasoned
that GoDaddy’s attempt to paint these Internet transactions as “the
unilateral activities of third parties” was misleading in light of the
significant steps that the company took before and after each
transaction. 250 As such, the court declared that “[GoDaddy] cannot
now point to its hundreds of thousands of customers in Illinois and tell
us, ‘It was all their idea.’” 251
Next, the court turned its attention to whether the conduct
underlying the complaint at bar arose from or related to GoDaddy’s
contacts with the forum. 252 Noting that the Seventh Circuit’s previous
opinions had not expressly adopted a particular means of addressing
this question, the court majority briefly addressed the proximate
causation and but-for causation standards employed by the majority of
federal courts. 253 The Seventh Circuit majority found the but-for
245

Id.
Id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. (citing Illinois v. Hemi Group, LLC., 622 F.3d 754, 758–59 (7th Cir.
2010)).
251
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 428.
252
Id.
253
See id. at 430. While some may read the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning as
expressly rejecting both standards, the court majority carefully couched its language
246
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causation standard to be problematically over-inclusive, whereas the
proximate cause standard was troublingly under-inclusive. 254
Declining to follow either approach, the majority settled upon the
“quid pro quo” standard recently created by the Third Circuit. 255
Outlining the contours of this approach, the Seventh Circuit explained
that the “the precise causal connection” between a defendant’s
contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is unimportant; instead, the
dispositive issue was whether the relationship between the two is
“intimate enough to keep the quid pro quo proportional and personal
jurisdiction reasonably foreseeable.” 256
Returning to the issue at bar, the majority found the relationship
between GoDaddy’s contacts with Illinois and uBID’s complaint
“close enough” to satisfy the relatedness inquiry. 257 As to GoDaddy’s
contacts, the majority explained that GoDaddy successfully solicited
business from hundreds of thousands of Illinois residents through its
advertising efforts, evidenced by the company’s substantial profits
derived from Illinois. 258 Moreover, according to the allegations in
uBID’s complaint, GoDaddy facilitated these sales by providing “free
parking” for its customer’s domain names. 259 As to the substance of
uBID’s complaint, it alleged that GoDaddy, in bad-faith, trafficked in
the domain names registered under its free parking service to garner
profits from uBID’s registered trademarks. 260 As such, the court
majority declared that the substantive relationship between GoDaddy’s
contacts and uBID’s complaint were so “intimately related” that the
domain name registrar could hardly be surprised to find itself haled
into an Illinois court to defend its actions. 261
to avoid this conclusion. Specifically, the GoDaddy majority stated that “[w]e have
not previously endorsed either approach, and we decline to do so now. Id.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id. at 431–32.
258
Id. at 431.
259
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 219, at ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
260
Id.
261
Id.
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Although GoDaddy asserted that the alleged injuries occurred in
Arizona, where the company incorporated its customers’ domain
names into the parked page service, these arguments fell upon deaf
ears. 262 Reasoning that GoDaddy was contractually obligated to
provide the registration services paid for by its customers, the court
majority declared that “[w]here GoDaddy chooses to locate the servers
that complete the task is irrelevant.” 263 Nor did the majority place
great emphasis on the fact that uBID would have the same claim
against GoDaddy regardless of whether the customers who registered
the infringing domain names “did so from Illinois, from Wyoming, or
from China.” 264 Rather, the majority simply explained that “the
concept of a geographic nexus” is difficult to apply where the alleged
wrongdoing can be described as occurring “wherever the Internet is
accessible.” 265 Notably, the majority’s opinion reasoned that the
geographic nexus is “simply less important” where the alleged harm
takes place online, as this is merely “one facet of the constitutional
inquiry.”The plaintiff still must establish the defendant’s contacts with
the forum, as well as their temporal and substantive relationship to its
claim. 266
C. Justice Manion’s Concurrence
While he agreed with the result reached by the majority, Justice
Manion declared that the jurisdictional issue was controlled by an
entirely different method—the Calder effects test. 267 Formulating the
effects test as requiring: “(1) intentional conduct; (2) expressly aimed
at the forum state; (3) with the defendant’s knowledge that the plaintiff
would be injured in the forum state,” the concurrence held that uBID’s

262

Id. at 432.
Id.
264
Id. at 431.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id. at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
263
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complaint established each of the required elements. 268 As to the first
element, the complaint at bar easily satisfied this requirement of
intentional conduct through its detailed description of GoDaddy’s
efforts to profit from the infringing domain names.
In regards to the second element of the effects test, Justice
Manion’s opinion seems to indicate that the act of cybersquatting—by
its very nature—satisfies this requirement. As the concurrence
explained, cybersquatting is simply a technology-driven method for
“defrauding business.” 269 The cybersquatter registers these domain
names to coerce his victim into making a choice—either pay off the
cybersquatter, or shoulder the costs of litigation. 270 In this instance, the
concurrence explained that GoDaddy’s “conduct is aimed at uBID’s
headquarters in Illinois,” where the company will be harmed through
its lost revenue. 271
Finally, the concurrence reasoned that GoDaddy’s alleged
cybersquatting sufficed to demonstrate its knowledge that uBID would
be injured in the forum state. 272 “In practical terms,” the complaint
described a “targeted scheme” that impacted uBID’s “bottom line.” 273
Logically, GoDaddy knew that its conduct would injure uBID “in
Illinois, where uBID is incorporated, where it pays state income and
property taxes, and where it has many employees.” 274
Looking back one last time at the second element of the effects
test, the concurrence concluded with a final thought: Although
acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit’s prior decisions demonstrated
some “tension . . . about the scope and limits” of the express aiming
component, the concurrence nevertheless concluded that this tension
provided no reason to refrain from using the effects test “where the
intentional acts are clearly directed at Illinois.” Moreover, to the extent
268

Id. at 435 (citing Virtual Works. Inc., v. Volkswagen of Am., 238 F.3d 264,
267 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Id. at 435–36.
273
Id. at 436.
274
Id.
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that a plaintiff must show “something more” to satisfy the express
aiming requirement,” the majority’s detailed description of GoDaddy’s
conduct within the forum satisfied “even the strictest ideas of what
constitutes “something more.” 275
D. A Few Last Points
Two aspects of the opinion bear a closer examination, the first of
which is the majority’s refusal to adopt the Zippo test for personal
jurisdiction. 276 While both parties asked the court to “either adopt or
reject” a standard that resolved the purposeful availment issue through
“website interactivity,” the majority expressly declined to take either
position. 277 Instead, the majority declared that the interactivity of a
defendant’s website is certainly “relevant,” but not “dispositve” in
assessing the sufficiency of the defendant’s contacts with the forum. 278
As such, the majority explained that adopting a separate standard for
examining “Internet-based contacts would be inappropriate when the
traditional analysis . . . remains up to this more modern task.” 279
The second issue that stands out from the GoDaddy II decision is
the dueling concerns voiced by the majority 280 and concurring
opinions. 281 While both opinions held that exercising jurisdiction
complied with the requirements of International Shoe, both the
majority and concurrence nevertheless took issue with the other’s
reasoning. 282
From the majority’s perspective, Justice Manion’s concurring
opinion adopted an unnecessarily broad reading of the effects test.283
275

Id.
Id. at 431 n.3.
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id. at 431 n.1
281
Id. at 433–35 (Manion, J., concurring).
282
Id. at 431 n.1 (voicing concerns about the concurrence’s application of
Calder’s effects test); see also id. at 435 (Manion, J., concurring) (troubled by the
majority’s relatedness inquiry).
283
Id. at 431 n.1
276
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Specifically, the majority felt that the concurrence’s reading of the
express-aiming requirement would result in an overly-expansive
jurisdictional standard for intentional tort claims. 284 Here, the majority
recognized that some federal opinions—including its own—read
Calder as supporting jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state in
“almost any alleged intentional tort.” 285 Nevertheless, the majority
warned that Calder “need not and should not” be construed “quite so
broadly.” 286
Yet the majority opinion was not alone in its judicial fingerwagging. Rather than confining its critique to a single footnote, Justice
Manion spent a few pages expressing his concerns with the majority’s
“unnecessarily broad” method of connecting GoDaddy’s forum
contacts with uBID’s complaint. 287 Significantly, Justice Manion
accepted GoDaddy’s contention that the actual conduct underlying the
complaint bore no relation to its contacts with Illinois. 288 Specifically,
the intentional conduct described in uBID’s complaint was entirely
unrelated to GoDaddy’s “hundreds of thousands of Illinois customers,”
and certainly did not “arise out of its advertising at sporting events.”
Without any connection to the various instances of “purposeful
availment” set forth in the majority’s opinion, Justice Manion
explained that the court’s application of Keeton effectively rendered
GoDaddy subject to suit in every state where the company “advertises
and has customers.” 289 In fact, the only limiting factor in the
majority’s analysis was whether a plaintiff could point to one customer
within the forum that registered an infringing domain name. 290

284

Id.
Id.
286
Id.
287
Id. at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
285
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III. ANALYSIS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CYBERSQUATTING AND THE
GEOGRAPHIC NEXUS REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. Where the Money Is: GoDaddy II’s Potential Impact on Future
Cybersquatting Disputes
This note suggests that the true significance of GoDaddy II is the
decision’s future impact on cybersquatting claims. In this author’s
opinion, one of the most interesting aspects of this case is the target of
uBID’s claim: GoDaddy. As stated earlier in this note, uBID did not
seek to pursue any of the various individuals that actually registered
the infringing domain names, but rather elected to bring its claim
directly against the registrar itself. 291
Why did uBID file its suit against GoDaddy? The answer is rather
simple. To quote the notorious bank robber Willie Sutton, “’[b]ecause
that’s where the money is.’” 292 The ACPA provides for damages up to
$100,000.00 for each infringing domain name, 293 thus uBID’s decision
to file suit against GoDaddy stems from a simple cost-benefit analysis.
Instead of pursuing each individual that registered an infringingdomain name separately, uBID simply filed a single, multi-milliondollar claim against GoDaddy. 294
The GoDaddy II decision may very well serve as a test-case for
the future of cybersquatting claims. As domain name registrars such as
GoDaddy are primarily “where the money is,” this author believes that
many plaintiffs similar to uBID will rely heavily on the reasoning
employed by both the majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II.
Indeed, the Motion Picture Academy recently filed a similar lawsuit
291

GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5.
FBI.GOV, FBI history Famous Cases,
http://www2.fbi.gov/libref/historic/famcases/sutton/sutton.htm (last visited March
30, 2011). This comment comes from an interview with Willie Sutton, a notorious
bank robber in the early 20th Century. Once asked by a reporter why he decided to
start robbing banks, Mr. Sutton famously replied “[b]ecuase that’s where the money
is.” See id.
293
See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d) (statutory damages provision for cybersquatting
violations).
294
GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5.
292

413
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol6/iss2/3

40

Barbakoff: No Shoes, No Service? Why Cybersquatting Has Outgrown the Interna

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 6, Issue 2

Spring 2011

against a domain name registrar based upon over 100 websites that
incorporate “The Oscars” into their domain names. 295 While the
GoDaddy II opinion speaks only to the jurisdictional issues of such
suits, rather than the actual merits of the plaintiff’s claim, 296 the
impact of the Seventh Circuit’s personal jurisdiction analysis in future
cybersquatting claims cannot be overlooked.
B. Extinguishing Zippo: the problems with using the interactivity of a
website to exert personal jurisdiction over cybersquatters
Before scrutinizing the analytical frameworks used by the
majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II, the framework that the
Seventh Circuit declined to adopt bears some consideration—the
Zippo test for personal jurisdiction. Given the jurisdictional issues
posed by the Internet, plaintiffs such as uBID 297 often rely on the
Zippo standard 298 to support personal jurisdiction in the context of
cybersquatting claims based on the interactivity of a defendant’s
website. As noted earlier in this Comment, many commentators have
begun to question the propriety of basing jurisdiction solely on the
interactivity of a defendant’s website. 299 For instance, in a typical ecommerce claim, the interactivity of the defendant’s website lacks any
substantial value in the jurisdictional analysis. 300
In the context of cybersquatting, the application of the Zippo
standard is particularly baffling. Imagine that uBID sought to sue the
individuals that actually registered the domain names that infringed
295

TECHDIRT, The Oscars v. GoDaddy,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100621/0056259883.shtml (last visited March
30, 2011).
296
See generally GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh
Circuit’s decision in GoDaddy II was confined solely to whether the defendant was
subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Id.
297
Id. at 431 n.3. Specifically, uBID argued that GoDaddy’s interactive website
supported both specific and general jurisdiction in Illinois.
298
Zippo Mfg. Co., v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.
Pa. 1997).
299
See supra Part I.C (outlining academic critiques of Zippo).
300
Dunham, supra note 146, at 580–81.
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upon its registered trademark, rather than GoDaddy. The parked pages
created under these infringing domain names were largely passive,
consisting of a rudimentary website filled with advertising links for
uBID’s competitors. 301 Under the Zippo standard, these passive
websites would fail to provide a sufficient basis for personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident cybersquatters that sought to infringe
on uBID’s trademarks. 302 Arguably, the same logic should apply to
uBID’s suit against GoDaddy. Since the conduct underlying uBID’s
complaint resulted from these parked pages as well, 303 GoDaddy
would also escape personal jurisdiction under the Zippo test. Indeed,
the pay-per-click advertising that fuels modern cybersquatting 304
deprives Zippo of any real utility—which is ironic, as this standard
was crafted specifically to deal with Internet-related claims. 305
Recognizing the inherent shortcomings of the Zippo test, the
Seventh Circuit wisely eschewed this standard in its jurisdictional
analysis. 306 Admittedly, the interactive nature of a website may provide
some indication of whether the defendant purposefully availed itself
by intentionally seeking to draw business from the forum. 307
Nevertheless, this intent provides no insight into the success of the
defendant’s efforts—the critical component to establishing the
contacts necessary to support personal jurisdiction. 308 A defendant’s
intent to create contacts with the forum is not enough to satisfy the
requirements of International Shoe; rather, the dispositive issue is
whether the defendant successfully created the contacts needed to
support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 309

301

GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (strictly passive websites are insufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction).
303
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 424.
304
Thibodeau, supra note 203.
305
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
306
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431 n.3.
307
Id.
308
Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
309
Id. at 254.
302
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C. Hustled: The Majority’s relatedness inquiry
The Seventh Circuit majority relied on equitable principles to
uphold specific jurisdiction over GoDaddy. 310 Essentially, the majority
applied the quid-pro-quo standard as a means of basing personal
jurisdiction on a highly discretionary cost-benefit analysis. 311 Rather
than examining the actual relationship between uBID’s allegations of
cybersquatting and GoDaddy’s contacts with the forum state, the court
focused on the reciprocal bargain between GoDaddy and Illinois. 312
As GoDaddy garnered business from hundreds of thousands of Illinois
residents through the sale of its parked page services, it was only
proper to require the registrar to submit to jurisdiction within the state
for claims arising from the same services. 313 A closer examination of
the majority’s opinion, however, demonstrates the flaws in its
reasoning, and underscores the fundamental disjunction between
cybersquatting and International Shoe.
The majority’s opinion sought to resolve the conflict between the
virtual conduct that constitutes cybersquatting with the only activities
that GoDaddy conducted within the state of Illinois—GoDaddy’s
successful exploitation of the forum state. 314 From the majority’s
viewpoint, this geographic link stemmed from two sources:
GoDaddy’s national advertising campaign, and its hundreds of
thousands of Illinois-based customers. 315 Based on these contacts, the
majority reasoned that GoDaddy’s exploitation of the Illinois market
created the same basis for specific jurisdiction as Hustler Magazine’s
exploitation of the New Hampshire market. 316 But as Justice Manion
recognized in his concurrence, this analogy ultimately fails. 317
310

Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431–32.
Id.
312
Id. at 431.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 431 (finding the relationship between GoDaddy’s numerous Illinois
customers and the cybersquatting alleged in uBID’s complaint was “close enough”
to satisfy the relatedness requirement).
315
Id. at 433–35 (Manion, J., concurring).
316
Id.
317
See id.
311
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The libel claim in Keeton provided a direct geographic nexus
between the defendant’s exploitation of the forum market and the
substance of the plaintiff’s claim. 318 Because the tort of libel occurs
wherever the allegedly defamatory publication is circulated 319 the
portion of the plaintiff’s libel claim that occurred in New Hampshire
arose at the precise moment that the defendant circulated ten to fifteen
thousand copies of its magazines within the forum. 320 This direct
causal connection rendered the Keeton defendant’s exploitation of the
forum market relevant to the Supreme Court’s specific jurisdiction
analysis. 321
Conversely, GoDaddy’s exploitation of the forum market bore
absolutely no relation to the substance of uBID’s claim. 322 In fact, the
majority failed to recognize that no aspect of either GoDaddy’s
advertising campaign or its numerous Illinois customers played any
role in uBID’s cybersquatting allegations. 323 This issue stemmed
directly from the majority’s failure to recognize the actual elements of
cybersquatting. 324 Under the ACPA’s safe harbor provision, the
registration of an infringing domain name, on its own, does not render
a domain name registrar liable under the ACPA. 325 Instead, the safe
harbor provision requires some demonstration of the registrar’s badfaith intent to profit from the domain name. 326
In light of the ACPA’s safe harbor provision, the substance of
uBID’s allegations centered entirely around the manner in which
318

See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984).
Id.
320
Cf. id. at 772, 778. As libel occurs at the point of circulation, the defendant’s
circulation of ten to fifteen thousand copies of the magazine effectively created ten
to fifteen thousand claims of libel within the forum state. Id. at 772, 778.
321
Id. at 773.
322
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
Id. The ACPA specifically provides a safe harbor provision for domain
name registrars such as GoDaddy. This provision provides that liability will not fall
on these companies upon the registration of an infringing domain name. Id., (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii)).
326
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii).
319
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GoDaddy manifested a bad-faith intent to profit—the various means
through which GoDaddy monetized the parked pages created under
the infringing domain names. 327 Unfortunately, the majority failed to
recognize that none of these allegedly wrongful activities created any
geographic connection between GoDaddy and the forum state. 328
Certainly, GoDaddy did not create these parked pages in Illinois. 329
Nor did GoDaddy place any advertising links on these parked pages in
the forum state. 330 Rather, all of the conduct described above actually
occurred online—or at best, at GoDaddy’s headquarters in Arizona. 331
This is precisely why none of GoDaddy’s hundreds of thousands
of Illinois customers had any relationship with uBID’s cybersquatting
claim. These contacts were nothing more than completely legitimate
business transactions that bore no relation to the intentional conduct
described in uBID’s complaint. 332 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
majority found that these perfectly legitimate contracts were “closely
enough related” to the substance of uBID’s claim. 333
Even when one ignores the ACPA’s safe harbor provision to
assume that the actual registration of these domain names rendered
GoDaddy liable for cybersquatting, only two out of the 171 infringing
domain names were registered by Illinois residents. 334 Notably, the
Seventh Circuit believed that these two registrations from within the
forum created the necessary geographic nexus between contacts,
claim, and forum to uphold specific jurisdiction over GoDaddy. 335
327

GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
Id.
329
See id. (recognizing that all of the conduct alleged in GoDaddy’s complaint
involved the creation and monetization of parked pages).
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431. Notably, the Seventh Circuit seemed to
take issue with GoDaddy’s entire business model by assuming that GoDaddy’s
alleged intent to profit from uBID’s marks was indistinguishable from the services it
provided to numerous Illinois customers who only sought to register legitimate
domain names of their own choosing. Id.
333
Id.
334
GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5.
335
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 432.
328
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This reasoning overlooks the fact that one cannot connect GoDaddy’s
alleged acts of cybersquatting to its forum contacts under the but-for
cause standard—the same standard that the majority dismissed as
overly-inclusive. 336
Although GoDaddy’s successful exploitation of the forum market
may arguably serve as a but-for cause for the two domain names
registered by Illinois residents, removing these contacts from the
causal chain would not alter the substance of uBID’s complaint. 337
Specifically, this would still leave 169 infringing domain names in
GoDaddy’s servers, 338 leaving the register perfectly capable of
engaging in each intentional act described in uBID’s complaint.
The majority’s relatedness inquiry raises substantial concerns
because the cornerstone of specific jurisdiction is whether the
plaintiff’s claim arises from or relates to the defendant’s contacts with
the forum state. 339 The geographic nexus between contacts and claim
allows a defendant to reasonably anticipate that her conduct will
subject her to specific jurisdiction within the forum. 340 Nevertheless,
the majority dismissed this crucial policy consideration by declaring
that “physical geographical nexus is simply less important” when the
wrongful conduct occurs via the Internet. 341 While the Seventh Circuit
majority may dismiss the importance of this requirement, GoDaddy
certainly would have preferred some measure of warning that it would
be required to submit to jurisdiction in Illinois based on the alleged
acts of wrongdoing set forth in uBID’s complaint.
Although the Seventh Circuit declared that “due process does not
require [the court] to slice GoDaddy’s alleged wrongdoing so finely,”
this argument turns the International Shoe framework for specific
jurisdiction on its head. 342 While general jurisdiction only examines
336

Id. at 430.
Contra Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (butfor cause standard requires a showing that the injury would not have occurred in the
absence of the defendant’s forum contacts).
338
GoDaddy’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 222, at 5.
339
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985).
340
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
341
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431.
342
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73.
337
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the geographic nexus between the defendant and the forum, 343 specific
jurisdiction is conditioned entirely on an additional nexus between the
defendant’s contacts and the plaintiff’s claim. 344
The majority’s opinion did not simply misapply the requirements
of International Shoe; rather, it blurred the distinction between general
and specific jurisdiction through its application of the quid-pro-quo
standard. 345 Indeed, the court implicitly conceded this fact by
dismissing the importance of the relationship between contacts and
claim, admitting that uBID would have the same claim against
GoDaddy regardless of whether the customers that registered the
infringing domain names did so “from Illinois, from Wyoming, or
from China.” 346 This casual disregard for the necessary relationship
between contacts and claim allowed the Court to uphold jurisdiction
over uBID’s claim through a gray area between specific and general
jurisdiction. 347 As a result, the majority’s discretionary cost-benefit
analysis subjected GoDaddy to what can only be described as
“intermediate jurisdiction”—a concept that perverts the requirements
of International Shoe.
D. The Unintended Effects of Justice Manion’s concurrence
Although Justice Manion chided the majority for its overly
expansive method of exerting personal jurisdiction over uBID’s
claim, 348 his concurring opinion fared little better. After recognizing
that none of GoDaddy’s forum contacts lacked a sufficient connection
to uBID’s claim, Justice Manion reached for the most attractive
343

Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.W. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414

(1984).
344

See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73 (plaintiff’s claim must arise from or
relate to defendant’s contacts).
345
Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 431.
346
Id. at 431.
347
Compare Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (general jurisdiction does not
require relationship between contacts and claim), with Burger King, 471 U.S. at
472–73 (specific jurisdiction is only proper when claim arises from or relates to
defendant’s contacts with forum).
348
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 434 (Manion, J., concurring).
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analytical framework in cybersquatting disputes—the effects test. 349
The effects test, as discussed earlier in this Comment, 350 sets forth a
three pronged test for asserting specific jurisdiction over an intentional
tort committed outside of the forum state, being: (1) intentional
conduct; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; and (3) with the
defendant’s knowledge that the brunt of the harm will be felt within
the forum. 351 Yet, whereas the majority’s application of Keeton
operated in the twilight zone of intermediate jurisdiction, Justice
Manion’s application created a far more troubling precedent—
universal jurisdiction.
Justice Manion failed to recognize the unique factual
circumstances underlying his chosen jurisdictional framework. 352
Namely, Calder’s effects test should not be read as an alternative to the
International Shoe framework. 353 Rather, the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Calder carefully outlined the manner in which the defendants
expressly aimed their conduct at the forum, as they relied exclusively
on California sources to provide damaging information about the
plaintiff. 354 In this fashion, the Calder defendants reached into the
forum to gather the necessary materials for their allegedly libelous
article. 355 Moreover, the forum became the focal point for the
damaging effects of the article because it dealt solely with the
plaintiff’s personal life and career as an entertainer in California. 356
Conversely, Justice Manion simply reasoned that GoDaddy
engaged in a “targeted scheme” to deprive uBID of profits through its
alleged acts of cybersquatting. 357 While this allegation speaks to the
intentional nature of GoDaddy’s conduct, it fails to illuminate how
349

Id. at 435.
See supra Part I.B.2.
351
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 435 (Manion, J., concurring).
352
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984) (detailing the manner in
which the defendant’s formed the necessary contacts with the forum state).
353
Id. at 790 (demonstrating that in certain circumstances, the commission of
an intentional tort may form the contacts required by International Shoe).
354
Id. at 789–90.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
Id.
350
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GoDaddy expressly aimed its conduct at the forum state. 358 Rather, the
concurrence simply posited that this scheme would affect uBID’s
bottom line, and thus was aimed at uBID’s headquarters in Illinois. 359
This terse statement simply conflates the express aiming prong with
the third prong of the effects test—the defendant’s knowledge that his
conduct will cause the greatest injury to the plaintiff within the
forum. 360
The problem with Justice Manion’s reasoning is that it substitutes
the one element that creates the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state—the express aiming component—with the defendant’s
awareness of the plaintiff’s home state. 361 Under this reading of
Calder, the express aiming requirement becomes a foregone
conclusion in cases involving a corporate plaintiff because the location
of its corporate headquarters is public information. 362 Similarly,
Justice Manion’s application of Calder obviates the third element of
Calder whenever the harm is economic in nature, as any impact on the
plaintiff’s bottom-line will naturally be felt at its corporate
headquarters. 363
This is precisely why Justice Manion’s explication of the Calder
effects test paves the way for universal jurisdiction. Essentially, his
opinion collapses the effects test’s stringent, tripartite analysis into a
single element—the commission of an intentional tort. 364 Under this
reasoning, personal jurisdiction is automatically conferred in the
plaintiff’s home state upon the commission of any intentional tort that
causes economic harm. 365 Yet, if the Supreme Court intended to set
358

See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006)
(something more is required than mere foreseeability of harmful effect felt within the
forum).
359
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 435 (7th Cir. 2010) (Manion, J., concurring).
360
Id. at 435.
361
Contra Pebble Beach, 453 F.3d at 1156.
362
See, e.g,. CYBERDRIVE ILLINOIS, http://www.ilsos.gov/corporatellc/ (last
visited 30, 2011) (website that maintains corporate records of corporation certificates
in Illinois).
363
Cf. GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 427 n.1.
364
Id.
365
Cf. id.
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such a low threshold for personal jurisdiction it would have expressly
stated as much in Calder, thus sparing the time and energy needed to
formulate the three-pronged effects test. Clearly, this was not the
Court’s intent, as this reasoning resolves the personal jurisdictional
analysis based on the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum, rather than
the defendants. 366 Naturally, this type of universal jurisdiction finds no
support from International Shoe and its progeny, which demonstrate
that the critical issue is the geographical connection between the
defendant and the forum state. 367 The effects test simply provides an
alternate means of analyzing International Shoe’s due process
requirements, rather than an alternative to the requirements of due
process.

E. A Proposed Solution: The Need for Nationwide Service of Process
under the ACPA
Ironically, while the reasoning employed by the Seventh Circuit
majority and concurrence in GoDaddy II undermines the due process
requirements of personal jurisdiction, their shared decision to uphold
personal jurisdiction over GoDaddy actually furthers the policy
rationale that gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in
International Shoe. 368 The Court created the International Shoe
framework as a means of adapting to the modernization of interstate
commerce during the first half of the twentieth century. 369 Just as
technological advances in travel and communication increased the
ease of conducting business across state lines, the International Shoe
reflected an equitable determination that “the need for jurisdiction
366

Contra Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (explaining that the
plaintiff’s relationship with the forum cannot support the exercise of personal
jurisdiction).
367
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985).
368
Specifically, the Court recognized that increased ease of engaging in
interstate commerce prompted the need for a flexible means of exerting jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
369
Id.
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over nonresidents” warranted a similar increase.370 As such, while the
Seventh Circuit’s decision to uphold personal jurisdiction over
GoDaddy may not comply with the letter of International Shoe, it
certainly complies with the spirit of the Court’s decision.
Clearly, the rise of the Internet has radically transformed the
manner in which most business conduct transactions across state
lines. 371 Yet, the cybersquatter is uniquely able to derive profits from
across state lines without ever creating the forum contacts necessary to
support personal jurisdiction therein. She has no need for warehouses,
offices, or employees. Instead, she can earn her living without ever
having to leave the comfort of her home. If the Internet permits
cybersquatters to benefit from their wrongful conduct by deriving
profits from across the nation, this privilege should carry with it the
associated cost of personal jurisdiction outside of their home state. 372
In particular, the need for a relaxed standard for personal jurisdiction
in cybersquatting claims becomes far more urgent when one considers
that domain name registrars—such as GoDaddy—may also run afoul
of the ACPA. 373
The Internet has created a unique niche for domain name
registrars, allowing these companies to siphon billions of dollars from
a worldwide market 374 without the need to establish brick-and-mortar
offices outside of their corporate headquarters. 375 For instance,
GoDaddy is an industry leader in domain name registration. 376 Its
370

Id.
Tavakoli & Yohannan, supra note 3, at 3.
372
Cf. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51.
373
See generally GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2010). The case that
forms the backdrop of this Comment arose from a cybersquatting claim filed against
the domain name registrar, rather than the registrants themselves.
374
The Digital 100: The World’s Most Valuable Startups, BUSINESS INSIDER,
Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/digital-100?op=1. [hereinafter The
Digital 100].
375
Id. at 424 (noting that GoDaddy has almost no physical presence outside of
its home state of Arizona).
376
See GODADDY, http://www.godaddy.com/ (last visited March 15, 2011); see
also GoDaddy’s BlackBoard, BUSINESS INSIDER, June 10, 2010,
http://www.businessinsider.com/blackboard/godaddy. The company proudly
proclaims itself to be the largest domain name provider in the world. Id.
371
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business presence does not merely extend throughout the country; it
extends across the globe. 377 At the time GoDaddy II was decided, the
company had an estimated value of more than a billion dollars. 378
Industry analysts projected that the company’s profits would grow
from approximately eight hundred million to more than one billion
dollars in 2011. 379
Due to its unique business model, GoDaddy has accomplished
this feat without the need to establish any additional premises outside
its home state of Arizona. 380 While the International Shoe rubric for
personal jurisdiction may prevent plaintiffs from bringing
cybersquatting claims against GoDaddy outside of its home state, the
equitable considerations underlying International Shoe seem to
demand a different result. 381
This Comment suggests that Congress—rather than the federal
judiciary—holds the key to resolving the conflict between the personal
jurisdiction framework of International Shoe and cybersquatting
complaints filed under the ACPA. With just a stroke of the pen,
Congress can amend the ACPA to provide for nationwide service of
process. 382 Such an amendment would free the federal judiciary from
relying on the International Shoe framework to uphold personal
jurisdiction over cybersquatting complaints. 383
Some critics may contend that this measure is inappropriate, given
that plaintiffs may file a complaint under the ACPA in the state
court. 384 While this is certainly true, both economic and practical
considerations undermine this rationale. Specifically, a state court
377

Id.
The Digital 100, supra note 374.
379
Id.
380
GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d 421, 424 (7th Cir. 2010).
381
Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958).
382
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 154.
383
Id.
384
The ACPA is part of the Lantham Act, which does not provide federal
courts with exclusive jurisdiction over trademark claims. See 28 U.S. § 1338 (2006)
(federal courts have original jurisdiction over trademark claims, but not exclusive
jurisdiction). As a result, a plaintiff may bring a claim under the ACPA in state
court. See id.
378
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must comply with the requirements of International Shoe’s framework
for personal jurisdiction. 385 This renders it highly unlikely that a
plaintiff would expend both the time and money needed to file a
cybersquatting complaint in state court only to risk having the
complaint dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. 386 Apart from
the economic interests of the plaintiff, a provision for nationwide
service of process under the ACPA would also protect the liberty
interests of the defendant to the same extent as the International Shoe
rubric for personal jurisdiction.
The geographic nexus requirement of International Shoe ensures
that the defendant can reasonably anticipate that her intentional
conduct will subject her to personal jurisdiction within the forum. 387
Yet, the absence of this requirement may not prevent a federal court
from upholding cybersquatting complaints filed under the ACPA—as
demonstrated by the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in GoDaddy II.
Conversely, a provision that allows for nationwide service of process
under the ACPA will resolve this issue by bringing the requirement of
reasonable anticipation back into the equation. Specifically, this
provision would provide individuals with constructive notice that their
chosen domain name may require them to defend their actions in the
federal courts of any given state. 388 Naturally, individuals can avoid
this undesirable result by first determining whether their chosen
domain name infringes upon another entity’s previously registered
trademark. 389 As such, a provision that allows for nationwide service
of process would actually further the interests of due process by
“giv[ing] a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows
385

GoDaddy II, 623 F.3d at 425.
GoDaddy I, 637 F. Supp. 2d 621, 630 (N.D.Ill. 2009) rev’d 623 F.3d (7th
Cir. 2010) (dismissing claim for lack of personal jurisdiction).
387
Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); accord World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 218, (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
388
Cf. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472.
389
For instance, one can perform a free search through a database of registered
trademarks. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark
Electronic Search System, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/index.jsp (last visited
April 2, 2011).
386
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potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some
minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit.” 390
While some may argue that the economic interests of the
defendant may outweigh the degree of predictability provided by
nationwide service of process under the ACPA, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide a sufficient means of addressing these
concerns. 391 Specifically, the defendant can avoid the costs of
litigating in a distant forum by filing a motion to transfer the case to
another venue. 392 Alternatively, the GoDaddy II opinion demonstrates
that these litigation costs already exist without a provision for
nationwide service of process. The equitable considerations that
promoted the Seventh Circuit’s decision will likely provide similar
outcomes in future cybersquatting suits. Moreover, the precedent set
by these decisions may begin to impact jurisdictional inquiries in other
areas of law, undermining the element of predictability that the
International Shoe framework seeks to provide. 393
A congressional amendment that provides for nationwide service
of process would bring an end to the jurisdictional nightmare created
by cybersquatting. This solution would allow the federal judiciary to
adhere to the policy considerations that gave rise to the International
Shoe framework—without undermining its requirements in the
process.
CONCLUSION
As Chief Justice Warren once warned, the rapid technological
shifts that ease the restrictions on interstate commerce must not lay
waste to the traditional limitations on personal jurisdiction. 394 In its
effort to abide by Justice Warren’s mandate, the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion in GoDaddy II cast aside the same due process considerations
390

World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (Change of Venue).
392
Id.
393
World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.
394
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958).
391
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which they struggled to preserve. The fractured reasoning employed
by both the court majority and concurrence each demonstrate how
cybersquatting has outgrown the limitations of International Shoe. The
key to resolving this disjunction, however, lies with Congress, rather
than the courts. As the ACPA provides targeted means of combating
the problems created by cybersquatters, it should naturally provide a
targeted means of subjecting these individuals to personal jurisdiction
outside of their home state. Therefore, Congress must step in to
resolve this jurisdictional quagmire by amending the ACPA to provide
for nationwide service of process. Such an amendment would allow
the federal judiciary to comply with the due process considerations
embodied in International Shoe—without eviscerating its
requirements in the process.
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